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NOTES
Civil Rights: Inconsistent Due Process Standards
Applied to Cases of Exclusion from Educational
Institutions
The highly formalized scheme of compulsory public education in the
United States mandates that the vast majority of young people attend school-
at least six hours, a day, 175 days a year, for twelve years.1 In addition,
students are urged to continue intellectual endeavor and training for employ-
ment after completion of high school in a myriad of vocational-technical
schools, junior colleges, colleges, and universities.2
Because education plays such a prominent role in the life of a young
person, the relationship of the student to the institution has been a source of
scrutiny, comment,3 and never-ending modification.4 Both the ultimate
educational product-academic and vocational skills-and the strictures of
the process itself have been the subject of considerable controversy among
educators, parents, and students. Forces outside the educational establish-
ment have complained that the schools are not developing responsible per-
sons who can function in society.' There are loud complaints by parents and
employers that "Johnny and Joanie can't read." ' 6 From educators the cry is
heard that students are undisciplined and disrespectful, rejecting attempts by
the schools to provide academic enrichment or socialization. The students,
on the other hand, complain that "education" is irrelevant to their needs and
I See, e.g., 70 OKLA. STAT. §§ 106-110 (Supp. 1980), providing for compulsory educa-
tion through grade twelve and mandating the number of days per year and hours per day that
school must be in session.
2 Oklahoma has established a network of post-secondary colleges and vocational-
technical centers. There are thirteen four-year universities and numerous junior colleges and vo-
tech schools.
I See, e.g., C. SiLBERmAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM (1975). This book is one of the
most notable among many written in the late 1960's and early 1970's criticizing education in
America for myriad reasons, e.g., too much discipline or not enough discipline; irrelevant, out-
dated curriculum; detrimental psychological effects on children; and institutionalized discrimina-
tion through standardized testing and course content.
' Such modification often began as educational theories and were translated into at-
tempts to structure education for each individual child. Innovative concepts, characterized by
words such as "modular scheduling," "open school," "values clarification," "peer counseling,"
"ungraded classroom," and "alternative schools" were products of the discontent with the
educational establishment of the 1960s. Unfortunately, many of these innovations met with
resistance from parents, students, and educators, resulting in ineffective and even disastrous pro-
grams that were either discarded or altered beyond recognition after only a few years.
I Hottlemen, Accountability Movement, 39 EDuc. DIo. 17 (Apr. 1974).
6Id.
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that the schools are unnecessarily strict in the standards of behavior
required.'
Because there are so many conflicting and sometimes irreconcilable in-
terests competing in the educational system, opposing forces have often met
on the judicial battleground to determine what academic and behavioral
standards may be demanded of students under various statutory and con-
stitutional provisions. Numerous questions have been litigated. Is education a
fundamental right?8 Does a student who is academically deficient have an
action for "educational malpractice?" 9 May a school system require a
minimum level of competency before granting a high school diploma?"0 Is a
school system required to provide educational programs for exceptional
children?" May parents object to the participation of their children in certain
aspects of an approved curriculum?' 2 In addition to these questions, the
rights of students in terms of "nonacademic" standards have been discussed
at length by courts. Decisions concerning hair length, dress codes," and the
rights of married students to participate in school activities,' 4 are numerous.
Educational institutions are, of necessity, going to determine academic
and behavioral standards for students. The enforcement of these standards,
however, has perhaps as great an effect on a student as does the formulation
of the standard itself. The determination of how these standards are to be en-
forced may be most critical in establishing an educational system that is able
to accommodate as many of the inherently conflicting interests as possible.
Only when individuals perceive that they are being fairly treated by a system
will they become amenable to the standards and constraints the system must
impose in order to function effectively. Determining what enforcement pro-
cedures are appropriate is characterized as "determining what process is
C. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM (1975).
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). There is no fun-
damental constitutional right to education.
' Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814 (1976). The stu-
dent's complaint of educational malpractice was dismissed.
" Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244 (M.D. Fla. 1979). The state of Florida was
prohibited from basing high school graduation on passage of a competency exam.
1 Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. State, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971)
aff'd, 343 F. Supp. 279 (1972). See also Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L.
94-142, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976). Exceptional children have a right to a "free ap-
propriate public education."
22 Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340 (Md.) aff'd, 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970); Medeiros v. Kijosaki, 478 P.2d 314 (Haw. 1970). Cur-
riculum in schools concerning family life and sex education was found constitutionally permis-
sible in the face of parental objection.
" Independent School Dist. No. 8 v. Swenson, 553 P.2d 496 (Okla. 1976). The length of
a student's hair could not be regulated because it affected out-of-school activity more than in-
school activity, and the school could not demonstrate a compelling justification for such an inva-
sion into the private lives of students.
" Davis v. Meek, 344 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ohio 1972). Courts have found that participa-
tion is an integral part of the educational process and have refused to find that a school has a




due."" Must there be at least a guarantee of an opportunity to be heard and
as a prerequisite, a promise of prior notice as to the subject of the hearing?
Must there be confrontation of adverse witnesses and the presence of
counsel?
Recently, the United States Supreme Court partially answered these
questions in articulating what procedural due process is to be accorded
students in two areas of education. In Goss v. Lopez6 the Court established
due process guarantees applicable to students who are facing temporary
disciplinary exclusion from a public school. Due process-necessary when a
student is to be permanently excluded from a university because of
"academic" insufficiency-was discussed in Board of Curators v.
Horowitz.
7
This note will examine the requirements of due process for students
faced with disciplinary or academic exclusion, initially focusing on the
reasoning of the Court in determining what process is due in academic and
disciplinary situations, and second, examining the impact of these decisions
on educational institutions and students.
Due Process in Disciplinary Suspensions
The United States Supreme Court historically has been unwilling to
impose judicial standards of conduct on educational institutions, deferring
instead to the expertise of the educators in determining what is most appro-
priate for a particular student. This reluctance has variously been explained
in terms of legal/educational doctrines that serve to offset implications of in-
dividual rights.' 8 Courts have stated that the doctrine of in loco parentis gives
school officials broad license to regulate the conduct and education of
students, acting as a parent would; 19 that minors are not fully protectible
"persons" under the Constitution; 0 that the schools need to operate effi-
ciently in order to disseminate the benefits of public education to the greatest
number of students;2 ' and that there is a "commonality of interest" between
educators and students based on the premise that most decisions made by
school officials are nonadversary in nature and are made for the purpose of
"helping" the student.22 Ultimately these considerations have resulted in a
cautious and narrow intrusion by the Supreme Court into educational
policies and procedures.
11 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 550-51 (1978).
16 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
', 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
I Comment, Procedural Due Process in Public Schools: The "Thicket" of Goss v.
Lopez, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 934 [hereinafter cited as Comment]. This note contains a full discus-
sion of the historical "non-interference" in school functions.
19 Id. at 943.
11 Id. at 944-46.
21 Id. at 948-51.
22 Id. at 951-53.
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In 19(59 the Supreme Court, in Tinker v. Des Moines School District,23
determined that freedom of expression guarantees of the first amendment
were applicable to public school students. The Court declared that, "students
do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse door." 2' This
recognition of the existence of individual, constitutionally protected rights,
even in light of the importance of the educational system, was not, however,
immediately followed by other decisions expanding the rights of students
beyond those stated in the first amendment. It was not until 1975, in Goss v.
Lopez," that the Court once again addressed the issue of constitutionally
guaranteed rights of a student.2 6
The question before the Court in Goss concerned the rights of a student
to some kind of procedural due process before being disciplined by a ten-day
suspension for misconduct at school. The defendant was among seventy-five
students who were suspended for involvement in student demonstrations at
Central High School in Columbus, Ohio. 27 Lopez was suspended with no
hearing as to the reason for the suspension. 2' He and eight other plaintiffs,
also suspended without hearings, filed suit under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act29 asking for declaratory and injunctive relief." Specifically, the
students maintained that the Ohio statute3 under which they were suspended
was unconstitutional because it permitted public school administrators to
deprive them of their rights to an education without a hearing of any kind
32
in violation of the procedural due process component of the fourteenth
amendment,"
The trial court found for the plaintiffs, declaring that they were denied
due process of law because they were suspended without a hearing prior to
23 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2' Id. at 506.
25 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
26 There are, of course, rights guaranteed to students in numerous state statutes and
school policy manuals. A survey of these guarantees is beyond the scope of this note.
21 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 570 (1975).
2S Id.
29 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides: "Every person, who under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress."
Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
" OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.66 (Page 1974) provided: "IT]he principal of a public
school may su;pend a pupil from school for not more than ten days. Such ... principal shall
within twenty-four hours after the time of expulsion or suspension, notify the parent or guardian
of the child, and the clerk of the board of education in writing of such expulsion or suspension
including the reasons therefor. The pupil or the parent, or guardian, or custodian of a pupil so
expelled may appeal such action to the board of education at any meeting of the board and shall
be permitted to be heard against the expulsion."
32 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 570 (1975).
" U.S. CONST. amend. 14 provides: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,




suspension or within a reasonable time thereafter.34 The court stated that
relevant case authority (1) would permit "immediate removal of a student
whose conduct disrupts the academic atmosphere of the school, endangers
fellow students, teachers or school officials, or damages property"; (2)
would require notice of suspension proceedings to be sent to the student's
parents within twenty-four hours of the decision to conduct them; and (3)
would require a hearing to be held, with the student present, within seventy-
two hours of his removal."
In affirming the decision of the trial court, 36 Justice White, writing for
the majority of five, determined (1) that a student had an interest in educa-
tion that was constitutionally protected 37 and (2) that the student was entitled
to certain due process procedures before being suspended.3"
The determination by the Court that a student possesses an interest in
education worthy of constitutional protection was the first pronouncement
that such an interest existed. Just two years before Goss the Court had deter-
mined that there was no fundamental right to an education for purposes of
equal protection analysis. 39 In Goss, however, the Court stated that the lack
of a fundamental right to education did not bar the creation of a protected
interest by some means other than the Constitution.4 0 The Court reasoned
that if a state mandates education for children between specified ages, as
Ohio did,4 students had a legitimate claim of entitlement, amounting to a
property interest, in public education. 42 This was an extension to education
of the reasoning previously applied to employment cases. 43 In such cases, a
state employee who, under a particular statute or rule could only be dis-
missed for cause had a legitimate entitlement to continued employment and
could demand the procedural protections of due process. 44 Thus the finding
by the Court of a property interest activated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to require some measure of process before a suspen-
sion could take place.
Additionally, the Court determined that the student had a liberty inter-
est in being free from suspension. The Court characterized this liberty inter-
est as "good name, reputation, honor or integrity,"4 5 finding that recorded
charges of misconduct could seriously damage the student's standing with
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 571 (1975).
S Id. at 572.
36 Id.
31 Id. at 572-76.
11 Id. at 577-84.
11 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
40 419 U.S. 565, 572 (1975).
4, OHno Rv. CODE ANN. § 3321.01 (Page 1972).
12 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975).
13 See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207
(1971).
419 U.S. 565, 573 (1975).
" Id. at 574.
19811
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classmates and teachers and interfere with higher education and
employment. ' ,
Thus the Court established two bases on which a student could claim a
right to procedural due process in an educational setting. First, if a state
statute provided for a free education, particularly if that education was com-
pulsory, the student would have a protected property interest. Second, the
Court found that decisions of educational institutions that affect a student's
reputation or future opportunities impinge on a protected liberty interest. In
establishing this protected interest, the Court specifically rejected the pro-
position that the existence of a protected interest should be defined in terms
of "weight." 47 The Court refused to determine that a ten-day exclusion from
a school did not impinge on the protected interest, quoting from Board of
Regents v. Roth,"' and stating that it is not the seriousness of the deprivation
but the nature of the interest that is determinative. 49 The Court found educa-
tion so important that even a temporary deprivation necessitated fulfillment
of fundamentally fair due process.
This analysis by the Court of the existence of a property and/or liberty
interest is a logical corollary to the important role of education in the life of
a young person. Because of the importance of education, any deprivation of
that experience should only be effected after the exercise of some measure of
care to prevent erroneous action.
After the determination by the Court that a protected interest existed,
the next step was to determine what process was due to a student who was
being excluded from school. In this context the Court dealt with one specific
situation, the suspension of ten days or less, 0 while alluding to the possibility
of other due process requirements in cases of longer suspensions"1 or suspen-
sions under "unusual circumstances."1
5 2
The Court found that in a suspension of ten days or less a student had
the right to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation
of the charges against him, and an opportunity to present his side of the
story. 3 The Court stated that there need be no delay between the time
"notice" is given and the time of the hearing, and that in short suspensions
the student has no right to secure counsel, confront and cross-examine
witnesses supporting the charge, or to call his own witnesses to verify his ver-
sion of the incident. 5' The Court found that to require more than this due
process could possibly overwhelm school administrators, costing more than it
" Id. at 575.
" Id.
" 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
41 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575-76 (1975).
10 Id. at 581.
"1 Id. at 584.
52 Id.
13 Id. at 581.
"4 Id. at 583.
[Vol. 34
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol34/iss2/5
might save in educational resources. The goal of the Court in balancing the
interest of the student in a correct determination of guilt against the interest
of the school was to provide "a meaningful hedge against erroneous
action."" The Court appeared to believe that a disciplinarian faced with a
factual dispute would undertake a more thorough investigation, perhaps calling
in witnesses and allowing cross-examination. 6 The Court, however, was will-
ing to leave this decision to the administrator, refusing to prescribe further
guidelines in a disputed fact situation.
In evaluating the "process" found necessary, it is instructive to present
a hypothetical situation to determine if the process outlined in Goss does in-
deed provide a hedge against error:
A principal calls a student into her office, telling the student that he has
been charged with starting the food fight in the school lunchroom at noon.
The principal states that three students and one teacher identified the stu-
dent.
The principal then asks the student if he has anything to say. The stu-
dent denies the incident, saying he was not in the cafeteria but instead outside
with four other students.
The principal does not believe the student's story and suspends him for
ten days.
Here the due process requirements of Goss have been fulfilled. The stu-
dent has had notice, an explanation of the charges, and an opportunity to tell
his side of the story. Nothing further is required by the mandate of Goss."
Rather, it is only the good faith of a school administrator that will provide
that hedge against erroneous action that the Court determined to be the goal
of due process. It is true, however, assuming that a disciplinarian acts in
good faith, that the requirement of an informal give-and-take hearing will
perhaps trigger a more exhaustive investigation into a disputed fact situation
or where mitigating circumstances might exist.
While the Court in Goss established that a student has a constitution-
ally protected interest in education and that due process is required, many
questions were left unanswered. As previously mentioned, the Court alluded
to, but did not delineate, other due process requirements that might be
necessary in the case of a longer suspension or one of unusual circumstances.
This failure to articulate standards in such cases has led to conflicting
findings by lower courts. In Dillon v. Pulaski County Special School
District,s a student faced expulsion for the rest of the school year for
violating two rules-kissing in the school hall and being defiant toward a
Id.
s6 Id. at 583-84.
, The facts stated in the hypothetical situation are closely analogous to a recent North
Carolina case where the process accorded was deemed sufficient. Pegram v. Nelson, 469 F.
Supp. 1134 (D.N.C. 1979).
11 468 F. Supp. 54 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
1981] NOTES
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1981
OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW
teacher when told to stop the offensive conduct. 9 The student requested and
was provided a hearing before the Pupil Personnel Committee. Not satisfied
with the outcome of the hearing, the student, pursuant to school board
policies, requested a hearing before the Board of Education. At the hearing
the student was represented by an attorney, but the attorney was not allowed
to examine theteacher who had witnessed the kissing incident." The student
sued for an injunction ordering reinstatement, for expungement of the of-
fense from his records, and for damages. The court found that the plaintiff
had been denied procedural due process because of the failure of the school
board to allow him to confront and cross-examine his accuser, 6 reasoning
that a disciplinary action of more than ten days would require confrontation, 6"
particularly where the accuser was a teacher who had already confronted the
student at the time of the incident and did not need the protection from
reprisals that anonymity would provide. 6" The court ordered reinstatement,
on procedural due process grounds, 6 expunging of the record, and one
dollar in nominal damages.
6
In another case, 66 where a student had been suspended for fifteen days
and urged a violation of procedural due process rights because he was not
given the right for compulsory process of witnesses, a right of confrontation
and cross-examination of the witnesses against him, and the right to
documents to be used against him, the court held that Goss did not require
the kind of process sought. 67 The court stated, in dictum, that such due pro-
cess would not be required even in the suspension of a child for the entire
school year for disciplinary reasons. 6
Thus one of the effects of Goss has been the development of inconsis-
tent standards in situations not covered by that decision. There are strong
policy arguments to be made that a deprivation of education for several
11 Id. at 56.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 58.
62 Other lower court cases have required such process. See, e.g., Strickland v. Inlow, 519
F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1975); Graham v. Knutzen, 351 F. Supp. 642 (D. Neb. 1972); Fielder v. Board
of Educ., 346 F. Supp. 722 (D. Neb. 1972).
63 468 F. Supp. 54, 58 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
6, The Court in this case followed a longstanding tradition of state and federal courts in
refusing to become involved in the substantive merit of the suspension or expulsion. The Court
stated that because the student's public display of affection had potential to disrupt the academic
environment, and because his response to the teacher could have been stated in a disrespectful
manner, it was proper for the school board to prescribe such actions as an unacceptable standard
of student conduct. Id. at 57.
69 The failure of the court to award more than nominal damages can be traced to the
stringent standards for the recovery of substantial damages for the violation by a school of a
constitutional right, as stated by the Court in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). A discussion
of the possible remedies under the Carey standard is beyond the scope of this note.
66 Whiteside v. Kay, 446 F. Supp. 716 (W.D. La. 1978), quoting from Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565 (1975).
67 Id. at 721.




months would trigger more substantial due process guarantees than did the
ten-day suspension in Goss, including compulsory process of witnesses, right
of cross-examination, and access to documents. Here the balancing of in-
terests must necessarily tip to accord the fullest procedure possible. Assuming
that long-term suspensions or expulsions are more rare than short-term
suspensions,' 69 the burden on the school administration would not seem to
outweigh the rights of the individual student. However, unless the Supreme
Court hears a case dealing with a longer suspension or expulsion, such incon-
sistent standards and denial of due process will continue.
In addition to the failure to articulate standards in circumstances other
than ten-day suspensions, the Court in Goss did not answer other procedural
due process questions. There is no consistent standard as to what constitutes
sufficient notice, what the requirements of impartiality are for a hearing offi-
cer, and the burden of evidence that should be met before suspension occurs.
Again, a survey of lower court decisions shows that inconsistent standards
exist. 0 Perhaps the most striking example of such inconsistency arises in the
context of the burden of evidence. One court required "substantial proof,"' 7'
while another required only "some evidence"" to support the school's deci-
sion to suspend.
It is necessary to question, however, whether it would be possible for
the Court to establish one meaningful standard in relation to these
unanswered questions. Considering the informality of most hearings, infor-
mality accepted by the Court in Goss, it is unlikely that the adoption of a
"substantial evidence" test, for example, would be helpful to school offi-
cials. The question of whether substantial evidence exists will often depend
on the subjective judgment of the principal, and without the formal eviden-
tiary trappings of a criminal trial applied to school suspension hearings it is
unlikely that such a test would be a practical tool to insure a hedge against
erroneous action. The Court may have articulated due process standards as
fully as possible, leaving the developments of other standards to practical
experience.
The decision of the Court in Goss was a bare five-to-four majority. The
four dissenters strongly urged that the interest in education was not unqua-
lified but subject to good conduct"l in the school. Moreover, a great concern
was expressed that the courts would become too involved in the decision-
making processes of the schools. In an often quoted passage, Justice Powell,
writing for the dissenters, expressed a fear that areas such as grading a stu-
dent's work, passing or failing a course, promotion, and exclusion from
interscholastic athletics would become objects of the courts' scrutiny.74 This
69 During the 1977-78 school year in one public school in Oklahoma, there were less than
ten suspensions of more than ten days in a student population of 600.
70 L. LEwis, CRITICAL ISSUES IN SCHOOL LAw 26-34 (1978).
11 Wong v. Hayakawa, 464 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1972).
72 McDonald v. Board of Trustees, 375 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
73 419 U.S. 565, 586-87, 597 (1975).
14 Id. at 597.
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scrutiny is inappropriate, according to Justice Powell, because judges lack
the expertise with which to evaluate such decisions.
Justice Powell's fears can be allayed in two ways. First, the opinion of
the majority was concerned only with procedural due process, not with deter-
mining whether the action was substantively correct. Courts have continued
to refrain from involvement in the merits of an educational decision absent a
clear showing that the action was arbitrary or capricious.
7
1
Second, decisions of lower courts subsequent to Goss have not expand-
ed procedural due process far beyond that envisioned by the majority in
Goss. In Dallam v. Cumberland Valley School District,6 a student who
challenged his exclusion from interscholastic athletics was found not to have
a protected property interest in such participation. In addition, the Court has
itself foreclosed any requirement of procedural due process in an academic
exclusion.77
Another comment seems necessary in regard to the dissent in Goss. The
theory set forth by Justice Powell in finding that there is no protected interest
is based on two premises. 7 Justice Powell argued first that the interests of
the school (and presumably the teachers and administrators) and the students
are congruent. 7 Because the schools are working toward the best interest of
the student., the Court should defer to process as established by the schools.
This theory is flawed in that it assumes that when a student is faced with
disciplinary proceedings he feels some commonality of interest with school
officials. The attitude of the student is much more likely to be hostility and
mistrust of the system. The student's desire to avoid a particular disciplinary
action will break down that commonality of interest.80 It is logical that the
only way to preserve any commonality of interest is to show the student that
the school is attempting to be fair, to tell him what the proscribed conduct
was, and to allow the student to tell his side of the story. Such are the pro-
cedural due process requirements of Goss.
Justice Powell's second premise, i.e., that "education in any mean-
ingful sense includes the inculcation of an understanding in each pupil of the
necessity of rules and obedience thereto," 8' ignores an additional meaningful
understanding that must be attained if children are going to participate in a
society governed by the Constitution. That understanding is that rules are to
be exercised in a fundamentally fair manner. This fair exercise, promoted by
" See, e.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978); Dillon v. Pulaski Coun-
ty Special School Dist., 468 F. Supp. 54, 58 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
391 3F. Supp. 358 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
" Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978), discussed at length, infra.
7 419 U.S. 565, 591-93 (1975).
11 Id. at 591.
80 Comment, supra note 18, at 952, citing Levine, The Right of Students To Fair
Disciplinary Procedures, 41 HumAN PGHTS 313, 317 (1975). See also Letwin, in Perspectives on
the Post-Civil War Amendments: After Goss v. Lopez Student and Status as Suspect Classifica-
tion, 29 STAN. L. REv. 627, 643 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Letwin].




the requirements of due process as outlined by the majority in Goss, does not
dilute appropriate sanctions; it merely requires that such sanctions be fairly
administered. Rules administered fairly are more likely to be accepted and
followed than those that are applied with no modicum of a fair procedure.
The decision by the Court in Goss precipitated a vast amount of legal
comment 2 and reaction from educators.' 3 Goss was characterized variously
as a "promise" in that it heralded a recognition of the rights of students,' or
as bad law because it changed the heretofore congruent interest of students
and teachers into one of constitutional confrontation.'5 Educators perceived
Goss as harbingering the possibility of increased litigation and personal
liability for disciplinary decisions.16 School boards and administrators deter-
mined that after Goss it was virtually impossible to suspend a student for
misconduct.8 7 Misinterpretation by attorneys led to the assumption by some
that Goss stood for far more than the Court stated."1 It would seem that,
given this lack of understanding, only written policies formulated by school
boards and education provided to teachers and administrators will ade-
quately inform educators and parents of the requirements of due process as
mandated by Goss. 9 Only when such policy is articulated and explained will
the implications of Goss be accurately reflected in the day-to-day functioning
of a school.
Goss is a progressive step toward recognition that a student has a pro-
tected interest in education and that, as such, some measure of process is due
before a student can be excluded, even temporarily. The failing of Goss may
be in its unanswered questions as to process due in suspensions of more than
ten days. However, there still exists the basic policy that some due process is
necessary, providing at least a minimal standard for school systems to use.
s2 See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Law: Goss v. Lopez: Much Ado About Nothing or
"The Tempest," 7 LOYoLA U. CH. L.J. 193 (1976); Comment, supra note 18; Letwin, supra
note 80; Kola, Hard Choices in School Discipline and the Hardening of the Due Process Mold, 4
J. L. & EDuc. 583 (1975).
11 Lufler, Unintended Impact of Supreme Court School Discipline Decisions, CoNTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES IN EDUC. 102 (1979).
" Letwin, supra note 80, at 637.
" Kola, supra note 82, at 585.
" Lufler, supra note 83, at 109.
87 Principals often operate under an assumption that it is difficult to suspend a student.
Not only is there fear of a lawsuit, but there has been an incorrect assumption that Goss requires
an adversary hearing with counsel and confrontation before a suspension for less than ten days.
1s In discussing school suspension with a Norman, Okla., attorney who had been con-
tacted by a parent whose son had been suspended from high school for five days, the attorney
commented to this author that the suspension took place without the presence of counsel or an
adversary hearing, and seemed shocked to discover that such requirements were not mandated
by Goss. This conversation took place in July of 1979, fully four years after Goss.
81 See the Appendix, infra, for a sample suspension policy written in August of 1979 and
adopted by at least one Oklahoma Board of Education in October, 1979, nearly five years after
Goss. This policy ended a period of uncertainty concerning procedural due process, uncertainty
that had led to the passage of three different suspension policies in that same school system dur-
ing the 1978-79 school year.
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One commentator has effectively articulated the advantages that will
accrue to a school system when procedural due process is afforded to
students:
Unless courts give much closer scrutiny to the substantive educa-
tional policies of public schools-and there is little indication in Goss
that they are inclined to do so-an increase in procedural protection,
for students is essential. Only through a procedural analysis can the
courts preserve the historical and in many instances appropriate
deference to the expertise of professional educators. It is important in
this context to keep in mind the limited goal of the Goss majority: to
provide, through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
a "meaningful hedge" against erroneous actions which affect the lives
of students. The majority did not, as Justice Powell would have us
believe, break any ground toward judicial determination of what is or is
not errroneous action. The majority assumes simply that a teacher or
principal who must pause long enough to state a reason for an action to
a student is less likely to give a bad or mistaken reason.90
Due Process in Academic Exclusion
After Goss a frequent question asked by legal commentators was
whether that decision signaled a new era of expansion of individual rights of
students.1 'this question was answered with an emphatic no by the Supreme
Court in Board of Curators v. Horowitz.92 Any promise that Goss had
shown as a portent of expanded rights was dashed, at least in the area of
academic exclusion from a university.
Charlotte Horowitz was admitted to medical school at the University of
Missouri in Kansas City in the fall of 1971 with advanced standing.' 3 Ms.
Horowitz was admitted as a third-year medical student after scoring high on
both the Graduate Record Exam and the Medical College Aptitude Test. She
had excellent recommendations from coworkers at the National Institute of
Mental Health, where she researched for more than five years in psychophar-
macology.9 4 In Ms. Horowitz's first year of school she received credit for the
six required clinical rotations, and in an evaluation report of June of 1972,
she was rated "above average" in all respects.' s
However, throughout that first year several faculty members had
expressed dissatisfaction with her clinical performance during a pediatric
" Comment, supra note 18, at 973.
" Note, supra note 82, at 212.
92 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 538 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd 435 U.S. 78
(1978).
'4 Id. at 1318.
11 Brief for the Respondent 2-3, Board of Curators v. Horowitz, on certiorari to the





rotation. The faculty members noted that respondent's "performance was
below that of her peers in all clinical patient-oriented settings," that she was
erratic in her attendance at clinical sessions, and that she lacked a critical
concern for personal hygiene.9 6 Upon the recommendation of the Council on
Evaluation, respondent was advanced to her second and final year on a pro-
bationary basis. 97 The following reasons were given by the dean in a letter to
Ms. Horowitz:
Your acquisition of information is good. Your relationship with others
has not been good and represents a major deficiency. You need to
improve your relationship with others rapidly and substantially. This
involves keeping to established schedules; meeting all clinical responsi-
bilities on time and gracefully; attending carefully to personal
appearance, including hand washing and grooming; participating
appropriately in the activities of the School; and directing criticisms and
suggestions maturely to your Docent and to the faculty member who is
in charge of a curriculum block as you may have criticisms and sugges-
tions.98
The following year, Ms. Horowitz ranked first in the school on Part I
of the National Board Examination for medical students and second on Part
II. She ranked fourth in her class in quarterly exams given in February, 1973,
and second in the May, 1973, exams.9 9 However, faculty dissatisfaction with
her clinical performance continued throughout her final year. At mid-year
the Council on Evaluation recommended that she not be allowed to graduate
as scheduled and that absent radical improvement she should be dismissed.'"
The letter setting forth these findings stated that Ms. Horowitz had to make
"very marked and very substantial improvement" in the areas of clinical
"competence, peer and patient relations, personal hygiene and ability to
accept criticism.''10
As an appeal of this decision, Ms. Horowitz was permitted to take a set
of oral and practical examinations. The council appointed seven faculty
members who had no prior contact with Ms. Horowitz to evaluate her
clinical skills. Three recommended continued probation, two recommended
that she be allowed to graduate on time, and two recommended immediate
dismissal.0 "' On May 28, 1973, the Council on Evaluation decided to dismiss
Ms. Horowitz from the medical school because she had not made the
improvements deemed necessary by the council. This recommendation was
96 435 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1978).
" Id. at 81.
Quoted from Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 538 F.2d 1317, 1319 (8th Cir. 1976),
rev'd 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
91 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 95, at 6.
100 435 U.S. 78, 81 (1978).
102 Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 5.
"02 435 U.S. 78, 81 (1978).
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subsequently sustained by the dean and the university provost for health
sciences.'°
Ms. Horowitz then filed suit in federal court pursuant to section 1983,
alleging a violation of procedural due process in contravention of the four-
teenth amendment to the Constitution. 0 4 The action was dismissed by the
district court in an unreported decision, and Ms. Horowitz appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. That court held that because the
academic dismissal from medical school had a serious impact on the student's
future by foreclosing the student's chances for employment in the medical
field, a hearing prior to dismissal was required by the fourteenth
amendment. 0 The United States Supreme Court subsequently reversed the
decision of the Eighth Circuit.'
In determining that Ms. Horowitz should not prevail in her action, the
Supreme Court determined that she had been accorded more than the con-
stitutional due process required in an academic dismissal, 07 and that in fact
there was no requirement of a hearing when a dismissal was for academic
reasons.' 0' The Court discussed but did not decide whether Ms. Horowitz
had a protected liberty interest in her education, which would necessitate a
determination of what process is due under the fourteenth amendment." 9
Although a claim of denial of substantive due process had not been decided
by the appellate court, the High Court also discussed the substantive ques-
tion, finding that Ms. Horowitz's dismissal had not been arbitrary or
capricious so as to infringe on any constitutionally protected substantive
right.I10
The ramifications of Horowitz are myriad. First, it establishes a dich-
otomy between the due process required by Goss in disciplinary exclusion
and in the academic exclusion faced by Ms. Horowitz. Second, it marks a
significant retrenchment by the Court in its willingness to examine rights of
students when those rights are arguably infringed by an educational institu-
tion."' Any promise of Goss outside the area of disciplinary suspension no
longer seems viable.
"o Id. at 82.
204 Id. at 80.
205 Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 538 F.2d 1317, 1321 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd 435 U.S.
78 (1978).
206 Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
207 Id. at 85.
103 Id. at 90.
100 Id. at 82-84. The Court, in effect, reversed earlier due process cases where it had held
that a determination of a protected interest was necessary before determining what process was
due. See, eg., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-76 (1975). See also note 38 supra, and accom-
panying text.
22 Id. at 91-92.
2 This retrenchment was further amplified in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
There the Court held that a student was entitled to no procedural due process prior to the admin-




Because the ramifications of Horowitz are great, it is important to
analyze the reasoning of the Court in (1) its discussion of any protected liber-
ty interest," 2 and (2) in the creation of the academic/disciplinary dichotomy.
Through a careful evaluation of the case, it is possible to determine that the
Court unnecessarily, and perhaps harmfully, limited important individual
rights in the area of education.
The first issue, the existence of a protected liberty interest, was dis-
cussed by the Court through a comparison of Ms. Horowitz's claim to that
of a person deprived of employment. In Bishop v. Wood"' the Court upheld
the dismissal of a policeman without a hearing, rejecting the theory that the
mere fact of dismissal, absent some publicizing of the reasons for the action,
could amount to a stigma infringing a protected liberty interest. Addition-
ally, the Court quoted Board of Regents v. Roth,' t " stating that a person is
not deprived of liberty when he is simply not rehired in one job but remains
free to seek another.'
While the Court declined to determine the "liberty" question, it is not
difficult to infer from the cited cases that the Court could easily have found
no protected interest. Without contradiction, the Court cited language from
Bishop and Roth that would determine a liberty interest on the basis of
publication of the reasons for dismissal or on total foreclosure from a par-
ticular job market. It would be unfortunate, however, for the Court in the
future to adopt the reasoning of Bishop or Roth. The effect of academic
dismissal upon Ms. Horowitz would seem to be at least as great as any stigma
attached to the "good name, reputation, honor or integrity" as determined
by the Court in Goss. Ms. Horowitz, in fact, faced total exclusion from the
medical field," 6 comparable to the possible exclusion from higher education
",2 Ms. Horowitz did not argue that she had a protected property interest such as that
found in Goss. One commentator has suggested that it would be difficult to claim such a prop-
erty interest for two reasons. First, the expectation of graduating is a unilateral expectation that
is not protected under the standards articulated by the Court. Second, there is no state created
guarantee of higher education in contrast to state guarantees of secondary education or con-
tinued public employment which create the protected property interest. Note, No Hearing is Re-
quired for the Academic Dismissal of a Student Even If There Has Been a Deprivation of a
Liberty or Property Interest Protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 47 U. CrN. L. REv. 514, 516 (1979). But see Gaspar v. Bruton 513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir.
1973) where the Court determined that the paying of tuition created a legitimate property in-
terest.
"' 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
"1 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
1- 435 U.S. 78, 82 (1978).
116 Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 9. As a consequence of her, dismissal,
Horowitz lost a job offer as a graduate assistant at the University of North Carolina Medical
School because it had been contingent upon her receipt of a medical degree. Horowitz v. Board
of Curators, 538 F.2d 1317, 1320 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 78 (1978). Horowitz, who is
unemployed at this writing, may never be able to find employment in medicine or in a medically
related field. The testimony of Dr. Hilliard Cohen, that Horowitz had been stigmatized by her
dismissal, that her dismissal was a "significant black mark" against her name, and that she
would have great difficulty finding employment in her field or obtaining admission to a medical
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found stigmatizing in Goss.1" 7 Thus, any court that adopts a prophylactic
rule requiring the publication of an academic insufficiency in order to find a
"stigma" would be acting unrealistically. Ms. Horowitz's reputation with her
peers and faculty was undoubtedly damaged by her dismissal. It would be
more realistic for the Court to continue the logic stated in Goss where the
Court recognized that damage to reputation and possible loss of future
opportunity was an infringement on a protected liberty interest.'8
The impact of the Court's negative reaction to a liberty interest may
never surface in subsequent litigation where academic exclusion is the ques-
tion simply because, as in Horowitz, the decision will be based on the lack of
a requirement for any due process hearing. 19 This possibility does not negate
this important threshold question that was ignored by the Court. If the Court
had examined the nature of the interest at stake in Horowitz, as it did in
Goss, there might have been a willingness to find that some process is
necessary in an academic exclusion. Perhaps it is for this very reason that the
Court did not determine the liberty question. If it had, it would have been far
more constrained in its pronouncement that there was no requirement of a
hearing. By ignoring the existence of a liberty interest, it was far easier for
the Court to avoid any meaningful balancing between that protected interest
and the nature of academic decision making.
The second area of the Court's decision that requires analysis is the
determination that notice of insufficiency is sufficient process and that there
is no requirement of even an informal hearing when an applicant is facing
academic exclusion.
20
Initially the Court distinguished Goss in finding that a hearing would,
in a disciplinary proceeding, provide a meaningful hedge against erroneous
action, but that such a hearing would not accomplish the same function in an
academic dismissal.' 2' The Court stated that academic judgments are by
nature more subjective and evaluative than the typical factual questions
presented in the average disciplinary proceedings.' 22 While such a statement
is undoubtedly correct, it begs the question of whether the student, because
of the severity of the possible exclusion, has an opportunity to be heard con-
cerning his side of the story. Goss was not and Horowitz need not have been
based on a determination that a decision might be subjective, thus leading to
school was uncontroverted at the trial. Id. at 1320 n.3. In addition, she will probably not be ad-
mitted to another medical school. Id. The court of appeals found: "The unrefuted evidence here
establishes that Horowitz has been stigmatized by her dismissal in such a way that she will be
unable to continue her medical education and her chances of returning to employment in a
medically related field are severely damaged." Id. at 1321.
--7 419 U.S. 565, 575 n.7 (1975).
' Id.
"' See, e.g., Miller v. Hamline Univ. School of Law, 601 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1979); Hub-
bard v. John Tyler Community College, 455 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Va. 1978).
120 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978).
121 Id. at 89-90.




no requirement of due process. As emphasized in Goss but ignored in
Horowitz, it is the importance of the presentation of all possible issues that
should determine the necessity of due process, not whether the ultimate deci-
sion, when all issues have been fairly presented, will be an objective or a sub-
jective one.
An immediate reaction to this proposal that a hearing is in fact
necessary in an academic situation might be fear that the requirement of a
hearing every time a student receives an unsatisfactory grade would over-
whelm the educational institutions. Such a fear might be well founded.
However, it would be quite possible to limit the requirement of such hearings
to cases, as in Horowitz, where the student is facing exclusion for academic
insufficiency. Such a limitation would recognize the importance of the in-
terest but at the same time would balance the interest against the needs of an
institution for orderly and efficient operation.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Horowitz, turned once
again to the contention of Justice Powell in Goss that a hearing in an
academic context will necessarily lead to a deterioration of a normal faculty/
student relationship.' 23 The same response given in Goss is appropriate .
24
When a student is faced with academic exclusion, it is doubtful that he or she
feels any congruence of interests with the institution. Only if the student
thinks that procedures are fair and impartial can a student perceive any com-
monality of interests.
Another basis for criticism of the decision in Horowitz, that an
academic exclusion warrants no hearing, was articulated by Justice Marshall
in his separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. 25 Justice
Marshall determined that the dismissal, though characterized as "academic"
by the majority, was in fact conduct related. This he found analogous to the
situations in Goss that gave rise to procedural due process requirements. 26
He stated that the reasons given for dismissal-personal hygiene and peer
relationship-were not at all academic, 2 7 concluding that in cases concerning
exclusion, a reliance on "labels should not be a substitute for sensitive con-
siderations of the procedures required by due process.'1
28
Commentators, in examining Horowitz, have supported Justice Mar-
shall's opinion that Ms. Horowitz's exclusion was arguably conduct
related. 29 In so determining, the conclusion has been reached that an empha-
sis on whether a student's dismissal is academic or disciplinary ignores the
issue that should be determinative, i.e., whether the facts in dispute are con-
123 Id.
"', See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
125 435 U.S. 78, 98-103 (1978).
I26 d. at 99.
7 Id. at 104 n.17.
12' Id.
"29 See Note, No Hearing Is Required .... supra note 112, at 522; Comment, Board
of Curators v. Horowitz, 6 HoFs-TA L. REv. 1101, 1123-25 (1978).
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ducive to determination by third parties. 110 Even if, in Ms. Horowitz's case,
there had been a finding that the fact situation was not amenable to third
party determination, it was unnecessary for the Court to foreclose due pro-
cess in academic disputes where an objective third party determination might
contribute to the protection of a liberty interest.
As a final consideration, the Court dismissed the substantive due pro-
cess claims of Ms. Horowitz.' 3 ' The Court once again deferred to the
"academic expertise" of educators, refusing to replace such judgment with
its own. This unwillingness to ask the basic question, "But, was it fair?",
comports with the Court's unwillingness to base a decision on substantive
due process grounds absent a showing that an additional important right has
been impinged, such as the right of privacy 32 or the right to maintain a
family. 3 3 While Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Brennan stated that the
Court should not have decided the substantive questions, but instead should
have remanded to the appellate court for a determination of that issue, it is
highly improbable that any violation of substantive due process would be
found. It seems instead that substantive due process is not a viable tool in a
case concerning academic exclusion or dismissal.
While the decision in Horowitz was unanimous in that all justices found
that Ms. Horowitz had been accorded adequate due process, separate concur-
rences indicate that in another context a due process hearing might be man-
dated. Justice White found that the decision was appropriate only because
there had been adequate due process.' 3 ' He, as well as Justice Marshall,
found no validity to the academic/disciplinary dichotomy. Justices Blackmun
and Brennan did not reach the academic/disciplinary question, voting to re-
mand on the substantive due process question.'" Justice Powell found the
basis for the dismissal to be purely "academic," relying on the findings of
fact of the district court.'36 It is unclear under what circumstances Justice
Powell would be willing to overturn the findings of fact, but should an occa-
sion arise it is possible that a majority of five might be willing to move into
the gray area between the academic/disciplinary dichotomy to afford a
measure of procedural due process.
The Court, in Horowitz, by refusing to find a liberty interest and by
failing to balance the interests of the student against the needs of an academic
institution, unnecessarily foreclosed to students a procedural tool that might
be beneficial in protecting a student's liberty interest. By establishing an arti-
ficial academic/disciplinary dichotomy, the Court narrowed the parameters
of due process protection that had been widened in Goss.
'30 435 U.S. 78, 106 (1978).
Id. at 90-91.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
13, Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
,14 435 U.S. 78, 96 (1978).
3I Id. at 109.





If Goss was an implicit promise that the Supreme Court would, in the
future, carefully examine infringements of student rights, Horowitz was an
example of a promise broken. Where the Court had in Goss established the
importance of education, its failure to extend the liberty interest to Ms.
Horowitz signifies a retrenchment in the recognition of this interest.
Although a hedge against erroneous action had been important in Goss, its
importance was necessarily diluted in Horowitz with the finding that a pro-
cedural hearing to bring forth all issues was not mandated. Finally, the
establishment of the academic/disciplinary dichotomy unrealistically narrows
the context in which a hearing could be helpful to resolve a disputed fact
situation.
Ultimately it must be said that a student who is facing temporary exclu-
sion from a public school has a greater opportunity for "process" than does
a person whose future in a chosen career is being absolutely foreclosed. Can
it be said that such a deprivation without process is in fact fundamentally
fair? While the answer must be a resounding no, reality dictates that this




I. Initial Responsibility and Authority
A. The principal of the school shall have the initial responsibility of
authority to order a student suspended for misconduct.
B. The principal shall, prior to making any decision to suspend a stu-
dent, make an investigation of all the facts and circumstances con-
cerning the alleged violation to determine that the conduct would
justify suspension.
II. Suspension of Three Days or Less
A. If a student is alleged to have violated the rules of the school, the
student shall be informed of the misconduct and the rule or rules
which are alleged to have been violated. The principal shall advise
the student of the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged
misconduct. The student shall then be given the opportunity to ad-
vise the principal of his or her statement of the facts.
B. The principal shall, after considering the evidence before him/her,
decide whether the facts justify suspension. If suspension is
justified, the student shall be informed of the decision being made
to suspend him/her, and the time of the suspension.
C. The principal shall make immediate contact by telephone or in
person with the parent or guardian of the suspended student, and
advise that person of the cause and duration of that suspension.
III. Suspension for At Least Three Days But Ten Days or Less
A. The principal shall follow the same procedure outlined in Section
II above, if it is contemplated that a student may be suspended for
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more than three days but not to exceed ten days. Except that, after
a decision is made, the principal shall give written notification to
the parent or guardian as soon as possible, stating the cause and
duration of the suspension.
B. At the same time written notification is forwarded to the parent or
guardian, a copy of such written notification shall be forwarded to
the superintendent of schools.
IV. Suspension for More Than Ten Days
A. If it is contemplated that, based upon the alleged misconduct, a
student may be suspended for more than ten days, the principal
shall inform the student in writing of the alleged misconduct the
student is accused of, and the rule or rules the student is alleged to
have violated.
B. Immediately upon delivery of this notice, the principal shall con-
duct a hearing as set out in Section III above. The principal shall
in all instances permit the student to state his/her views of the
facts in the case and consider those in making his/her decision as
to whether to suspend the student or not.
C. If a decision is made to suspend the student, the principal shall
give written notification to the parent or guardian as soon as
possible, stating the cause and duration of the suspension.
D. The principal shall forward a copy of such written notification of
suspension, together with a copy of the notice given to the student,
to the superintendent of schools.
V. Appeals
A. If the principal shall order a student suspended, an appeal may be
made to the principal by the student or the student's parent or
guardian, and the principal shall thereupon provide the opportun-
ity for a new hearing, and the student and parent or guardian may
be present at such new hearing and take part therein.
B. At this appeal hearing, the principal need not call witnesses, but
may advise the student or parent or guardian of the facts that he
has determined, but he shall give the student and/or parents or
guardian the opportunity to present evidence in behalf of the stu-
dent.
C. There should be no right to legal counsel at this appeal hearing.
D. After considering all of the evidence together with any new
evidence submitted by the student and/or his parent or guardian,
the principal shall decide whether the suspension order shall re-
main in effect and advise the student and/or parents of his/her
decision.
E. If the student and/or parent or guardian is not satisfied with the
decision of the principal after the new hearing before the prin-
cipal, the student and/or parent or guardian may appeal to the
Superintendent of Schools. The Superintendent shall, as soon as




student and parent or guardian may be present and may take part
and present evidence on behalf of the student.
F. Upon conclusion of the hearing by the Superintendent, the
Superintendent shall make a decision whether to sustain the
suspension ordered by the principal, to modify the suspension
order by either increasing or decreasing the suspension time, or by
reversing the decision of the principal. In any event, the student or
parent or guardian and the principal shall be advised in writing of
the Superintendent's action.
VI. Appeals to the Board of Education
A. If a student, or the student's parent or guardian is not satisfied
with the ruling of the Superintendent of Schools provided for in
Section V above, then the student or parent or guardian may ap-
peal to the Board of Education in the following manner:
(a) an appeal to the Board of Education shall be made in writing
through the Superintendent of Schools.
(b) prior to such hearing before the Board of Education the stu-
dent shall be advised in writing of the evidence upon which
the charges are based.
(c) the student will be advised that he/she is entitled to be pres-
ent in person at the hearing before the Board of Education,
and to have a representative at such hearing to act in his/her
behalf.
(d) the student will be informed of the procedure to be followed
at the hearing and will be given a reasonable time to prepare
for such hearing.
(e) the student may be represented at such hearing by his/her
parent or guardian, or by legal counsel.
(f) at the hearing before the Board of Education the student or
his/her representative shall have the right to examine
evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses, and present
evidence and testimony on behalf of the student.
(g) at the conclusion of such hearing before the Board of Educa-
tion, the decision of the Board shall be final.
VII. Time of Suspension
A. All suspensions shall take place immediately upon the suspension
order unless the principal or the Superintendent of Schools shall
delay the suspension pending the appeal process.
B. It shall be the general policy to stay the imposition of the suspen-
sion until the appropriate appeal process is completed; however, if
the presence of the student at the school poses a risk of danger or
harm to the student, or his/her classmates or employees of the
school system or the property of the school system, the suspension
should be immediate. This decision shall be made by the principal
of the student involved.
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